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Of the American Philosophical Association, Professor A. C. Armstrong was elected president; Professor W. E. Hoeking, vice-president; and Professor E. G. Spaulding, secretary and treasurer. The new members of the executive committee are Professors Morris R. Cohen and Wilbur M. Urban.

Of the Western Philosophical Association, Professor A. H. Lloyd was elected president; Professor C. E. Cory, vice-president; and Professor H. C. Longwell, secretary. Professors F. C. Sharp, H. B. Alexander, E. H. Hollands, and E. H. Lindley were elected new members of the executive committee.

It had long been felt that the title, American Philosophical Association, was too comprehensive to be properly the name of any single society. Ten years ago, after some correspondence between the American and the Western Philosophical Associations, the American Association voted to defer the matter of a possible change of name until there should be a joint meeting of the two associations. The meeting just held at Chicago being the first joint meeting, the question was automatically revived. The association, accordingly, instructed the Executive Committee, as supplemented by three members to be appointed by the Chair, to consider the advisability of a change of name together with some sort of amalgamation among the three philosophical associations of the country.

The place and date of the next meeting of the Association were left to the Executive Committee with power.

WENDELL T. BUSH.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Distinction Between Mind and Its Objects. BERNARD BOSANQUET.
Manchester, England: University Press. 1913. Pp. 73.

Mr. Bosanquet in an interesting lecture expounds the new realism as promulgated from the University of Manchester, and especially from Dr. Alexander. To Mr. Bosanquet the doctrine of "physical realism" seems to stand midway between materialism and idealism. If materialistic, it is not so in the old sense, for it aims at a complete recognition of the world as we know and love it, and has no faith in a prerogative reality of spatial properties. It accepts external things in all their concrete richness of existence as reality independent of mind: color and music are just as real as atoms and gravitation. There is no higher and lower plane of reality: universals, too, are real, and are not a product of mind. Mr. Bosanquet presents this view with sympathy and enthusiasm, and welcomes a philosophy that gives us so full and rich a world. Yet he can not accept the doctrine in its entirety, and when he passes from presentation of his subject to criticism of it, it is like passing from sunlight to shadow, for meanings become blurred and misty for the ordinary unsophisticated

mind. The criticism contains nothing that has not been urged before by critics of the Hegelian type. Just how does it throw light on the question of universals to be told that "a universal is the effort of a content to complete itself as a system"? And is the question of the mental or non-mental character of objects of sense made more clear by Mr. Bosanquet's discussion of "blue"? He says: "What I see when I look at a blue thing has unity and life. Its parts support and determine one another by explicit compresence, it pulsates with feeling, a common tone which involves the presence of a whole all at once, reinforcing and modifying every part by the simultaneous effects of all. . . . What makes the blue reinforce and modify the blue? . . . What sort of medium does such a unity involve? Surely that of consciousness and no other. Blue, then, while it retains the character of blue, must have in it the life of mind." What does this mean? I am sure the ordinary person, even the ordinary philosopher, would be depressed and bewildered by this account of "blue."

The main point of Mr. Bosanquet's criticism is that the realist has reduced the place of mind in the world to its narrowest conceivable limits, and has cut off from it the great body of physical reality. To Mr. Bosanquet this cut-off body of reality shows within itself a "vitality, primarily logical, but for this reason ultimately and in essence involving continuity with a psychical system." As long as this severance prevails, a just estimate of "reality-values" is impossible.

For (1) it is a mistake to take mind as one object and reality as another. "Mind is always a whole, . . . an object is a fragment." This fact makes it difficult to assess the reality of objects apart from mind. "For what is real must surely be a whole, whatever else may be its character."

(2) Mr. Bosanquet can not accept the theory that sense presentations are non-mental and physical. For any analysis of a sense content, "blue," for instance, seems to show (as quoted above) that blue possesses a kind of unity that shows it has in it the life of mind. It is "logical." This is true also when we analyze what is meant by a universal. A universal is of "the nature of a conation," an endeavor towards a whole which indicates participation in the life of mind. Also the tertiary qualities can not escape being regarded as distinctively psychical.

(3) But above all, the realist fails to be satisfactory because he has failed to inquire into the conditions of self-existence. If you want to find out what is real, you must ask what it is to be self-existent. Mr. Bosanquet says "The nature of being a world or whole is what I take to be the condition of self-existence." "A mind is a whole, that is, in its nature and intent; an object is a fragment." "There can be no concrete whole, but a whole centering in mind, and no self-existent whole but a concrete whole." Does the reality of the physical realist measure up to this? No, not if its reality is abstracted from mind, and so rendered dead and meaningless. "Objects of finite mind and finite mind itself . . . are details of reality essentially continuous with each other and reciprocally indispensable." The realist makes the mistake of confusing "independent of" with "in abstraction from." Mr. Bosanquet's conclusion is that "the

continuity of the real world with mind is the inevitable goal and climax of twentieth-century physical realism as opposed to eclectic materialism." "If the object is to be real in its fullness, as it is the merit of that doctrine to affirm, it must be maintained in connection with its complete conditions. To try and hypostatize it apart from organisms and their minds is an evasion of the task. . . . Abstraction is an abandonment of the quest."

FLORENCE C. LAMONT.

ENGLEWOOD, N. J.

The Elements of Psychology. DAVID R. MAJOR. Columbus, Ohio: R. G. Adams and Company. 1914. Pp. xv + 413.

The revised edition of Professor Major's work is almost identical with the original edition. Sundry corrections, notably of anatomical errors, and some slight additions are made. Minor rearrangements of material have also been undertaken—such as bringing what was formerly printed under "The Nature of Attention," into a new section entitled "Popular View of Attention."

The reviewer in commenting upon the unrevised edition expressed the wish that some portions of the text had been less of the nature of pabulum, since in his judgment one way of raising standards of scholarship is to presuppose a modicum of intelligence in one's students. It may be that this opinion was unjustified, but it still remains difficult for him to conceive how students of college age should require the enlightenment of the following paragraph which has been added to the section "Thought as Judgment." In explanation of the phrase "relation to other things" (p. 252) we have the following:

"Suppose one is thinking of a boulder's 'relations' to other things. To assert that the boulder lies to the right or left, east or west, above or below, inside or outside, of some other specified thing, that it is east of a given oak tree and inside an iron fence, is to utter judgments regarding its *spatial* relations. Temporally regarded, one may continue, the boulder in its present form antedates certain geologic events and is subsequent to certain others. Again, one is thinking of *causal* relations when one affirms that the boulder's present form and position are due to glacial action. One may designate its further relations by noting that it is composed of certain substances and belongs to such and such a class of rocks. These may serve as examples of statements regarding the physical relations in which objects stand to one another. We also speak of 'human relations,' the relations in which human beings stand to one another, *e. g.*, parent and child, principal and agent, author and reader, judge and jury, general and army, class and pupil, society and individual, and so on."

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